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COMMENT
RENO V. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMMITTEE, ETAL.: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS UNDER THE IIRIRA
INTRODUCTION

Although Congress has power to regulate immigration' and federal
court jurisdiction,2 these powers are subject to an important limitation:
Congress may not completely foreclose judicial review of constitutional
claims.' In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
("AAADC"), aliens challenged a federal immigration statute on grounds
that it effectively foreclosed meaningful review of their constitutional
challenges to deportation. Consistent with prior decisions addressing
judicial review, the United States Supreme Court narrowly interpreted
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 ("IIRIRA" or "Act"), and upheld the Act's prohibition against judicial review of non-final orders The Court's interpretation of the Act in
AAADC marks a significant change in immigration law, by severely restricting district court access as a means of challenging the constitutionality of non-final Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) actions.'
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of the IIRIRA, as
well as the process courts used to review deportation claims prior to enactment of the HRIRA. Part II analyzes the Court's opinion in AAADC.
Part III discusses how AAADC is consistent with other decisions addressing jurisdictional restrictions. Part III also outlines the various avenues of judicial review that remain available after AAADC. Part IV asserts that AAADC insulated the exercise of executive discretion from

I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
2. See id. at art. Il, § 2.
3. See Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)
(noting that a "serious constitutional question" would arise if an administrative statute were
construed as foreclosing judicial review of constitutional claims (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 762 (1975)); Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 921 n.l 13 (1984) ("[A]II
agree that Congress cannot bar all remedies for enforcing federal constitutional rights."). See also
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (explaining that Congress must be clear if it intends to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims). But see McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498
U.S. 479, 501 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that the Supreme Court has never held
that Congress could not explicitly preclude judicial review of constitutional claims).
4. Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 941 (1999).
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 & 18 U.S.C.).
6. See Reno, 119 S. Ct. at 942-43.
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judicial review, and thereby upheld the streamlined deportation process
intended by Congress.
I. BACKGROUND

Congressional control over immigration has been described as "plenary" in nature. 7 According to the plenary powers doctrine, the judiciary
accords great deference to Congress in the regulation of immigration.
Early immigration cases reflected a strong adherence to this doctrine as
immigration issues were often determined political in nature and therefore outside of the judiciary's power.' These deferential decisions date
back to as early as 1875, when in response to public reaction to the rapid
increase in immigration, Congress began the enactment of restrictive
legislation aimed at the exclusion of certain classes of immigrants.'" Restrictive immigration legislation continued to be implemented throughout
the early part of the twentieth century." For example, the Immigration
Acts of 1917 and 1924 set forth quotas for each nationality, as well as
qualitative restrictions on the types of admissible aliens.'2 Immigration
regulation was essentially controlled by these two Acts until 1952.'
In 1952, Congress overhauled established immigration law through4
the enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 ("INA").1
The INA codified prior immigration laws and established the current
system governing the immigration and naturalization process.'5 Since its
7. For an interesting critique of the plenary powers doctrine, see Maureen Callahan
VanderMay, The Misunderstood Origins of the Plenary Powers Doctrine, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
147 (1999).
8.

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

§

3.5, at

207 (1997).
9. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding a statute which
prohibited the return of Chinese laborers who had received certificates from the government
evidencing their right to return to the United States). "Whether a proper consideration by our
government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its
action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from
the country after the passage of the act, are not questions for judicial determination." Chae Chan
Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding law
requiring aliens entitled to remain in the United States to apply for a certificate of residence). "The
question whether, and upon what conditions ... aliens shall be permitted to remain within the United
States being one to be determined by the political departments of the government, the judicial
department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom, the policy or the justice of the
measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it by the Constitution over
this subject." Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 731.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22 &
50 U.S.C.); see also 3A AM. JUR. 2D Aliens and Citizens § 5 (1998) (discussing enactment of INA).
15. See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 15 (2oded. 1992) (citing U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN
DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION, 7-12 (1980)).
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implementation, the INA has continued to serve as the basic immigration
law of the United States.16 Prior to enactment of the IIRIRA in 1996,
judicial review of most immigration actions was governed by INA Section 1105a.17 1105a stated that "the sole and exclusive procedure
for ... judicial review of all final orders of deportation" shall be set forth
in the Hobbs Act." Under the Hobbs Act, the courts of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction, 9 and judicial review was limited solely to the administrative record upon which the deportation order was based. 0
The scope of Section 1105a was first interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Chen Fan Kwok v. INS.2' In that case, a final order of deportation had been entered against the petitioner pursuant to INA Section
242(b). 22 242(b) provided for an administrative procedure that determined
the deportation of aliens. 3 Pursuant to Section 242(b), a special inquiry
officer entered an order of deportation based upon a record made before
him. An alien could request various forms of discretionary relief from
the special inquiry officer during the course of the proceedings. At the
conclusion of 242(b) proceedings, INS regulations provided that an alien
under a final order of deportation could apply to the INS district director
for a stay of deportation.
The Petitioner in Chen Fan Kwok conceded deportability in his
242(b) proceeding, and volunteered to leave the country. He did not,
however, leave and eventually a deportation order was entered against
him. He then applied to the district director for a stay of deportation.2627
His request for a stay was denied, and he appealed to the Third Circuit.

The Third Circuit dismissed the petitioner's claim for lack of jurisdiction." The circuit court reasoned that the petitioner was appealing the
district director's denial of his request, and not the order entered against
him in the 242(b) proceeding.29 Thus, the Third Circuit found Section
1105(a) jurisdiction inapplicable as the Section granted jurisdiction to the
courts of appeals only for claims appealing 242(b) final orders.'

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

66 Stat. 163.
8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1994) (repealed 1996).
Id.§ l105a.
28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1994).
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(4) (repealed 1996).
Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968).
See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 207.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (repealed 1996).
Id.
See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 207.
See id.
See id. at 208.
See id. at 210.
See id. at 212.
See Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 381 F.2d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 1967).
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court rejected the INS' argument that
Section 1105a encompassed all appeals from orders directly affecting a
deportation order.' The Court affirmed the Third Circuit's narrow interpretation of Section 1105a and limited the statute's application to appeals
from determinations made pursuant to Section 242(b) proceedings, or
motions to reopen such proceedings. For denials of discretionary relief
entered by INS directors, the Court stated, "the alien's remedies would,
of course, ordinarily lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district court."32
The Court's narrow reading of Section 1105a gave aliens access to
district courts to challenge various INS practices. Many of these challenges involved constitutional challenges to deportation.33 Because such
claims could not be reviewed on the basis of the administrative record,
courts found Section 1105a's proscription to be inapplicable to various
INS actions and decisions involved in the deportation process. 34 Instead,
courts exercised jurisdiction over these claims under federal question
jurisdiction, .5 .habeas corpus jurisdiction, 36 or 8 U.S.C. § 1329,"7 which
provided federal jurisdiction for all claims arising under federal immigration law."
The Court narrowly interpreted other jurisdictional provisions of the
INA as well, allowing for class action challenges to INS practices.3 9 For
example, in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center Inc.,4° the Court interpreted the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 4 ("Reform
Act") in favor of allowing immediate judicial review for ancillary constitutional claims. 2 McNary involved a class action challenging the procedures by which the INS was administering the Special Agricultural
Workers ("SAW") program enacted by the Reform Act. The court addressed the issue of whether Section 210(e) of the INA precluded district
courts from exercising federal-question jurisdiction over constitutional
31. See Cheng Fan Kwok, 392 U.S. at 209-10. "If, as the Immigration Service urges, [l105a]
embraces all determinations 'directly affecting the execution of a final deportation order, Congress
has selected language inapposite to its purpose." Id. at 213.
32. Id.at 210.
33. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 944 (1999)
(claims included "selective prosecution, in violation of equal protection or due process") (quoting 6
C. GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03 [2][h] (1998)).
34. See id.
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
36. See id. § 2241 (1994).
37. 8 U.S.C. § 1329 (1994).
38. See David Cole, Jurisdictionand Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress's Control of FederalJurisdiction86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2486 (1998).
39. See McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 490 (1991).
40. 498 U.S. 479, 486(1991) (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)).
41. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections 5, 7, 8, 20, 26, 29, 31, 42
& 50 U.S.C. (1986)).
42. See McNary, 498 U.S. at 497-98.
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claims involving INS procedures.43 Section 210(e) prohibited judicial
review of a final administrative determination of "special agricultural
worker" status except in the context of an order of exclusion or deportation."
The Court held that "given the absence of clear congressional language mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction and the nature of rewas proper.45
spondents' requested relief," federal-question jurisdiction
The Court stated that it assumed Congress was aware of the "well settled
presumption favoring interpretations of statutes that allow judicial review
of administrative action." 46 In interpreting the statute to allow for judicial
review prior to a final deportation order, the Court reasoned that even in
the context of a deportation proceeding, a court of appeals would not
likely be in a position to provide "meaningful review" of constitutional
claims.47 Judicial review of collateral constitutional claims challenging
INS practices would be limited to the administrative record of individual
applicants, making it impossible to establish a class wide pattern of un48
constitutional practices. Moreover, a court of appeals reviewing a collateral constitutional challenge would lack the fact-finding capabilities of
a district court. 49 According to the Court, restricting review of an individual deportation order to the court of appeals was essentially a denial
of judicial review of constitutional and statutory claims. 50
By the mid-1990's, the topic of illegal immigration began to receive
significant public attention." In 1995, the House Subcommittee on ImClaims held hearings on the removal of criminal and illemigration and
12
gal aliens. According to the opening statement of Chairman Lamar

43. See id. at 483.
44. Id. at 479.
45. Id. at 483-84.
46. Id. at 496 (citing Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670
(1986)).
47. Id. at 497.
48. See id.
49. See id
50. See id. In dissent, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia stated that the "strong presumption" in
favor of judicial review of administrative action was only applicable in the absence of a clear
congressional intent to prohibit such review. The presumption was inapplicable because the statute
clearly prohibited review of INS actions outside the context of review of final deportation or
exclusion orders. According to the dissent, Congress clearly intended to preclude judicial review of
constitutional claims, which it could rightfully do. The Court had never held that Congress could not
explicitly preclude judicial review of constitutional claims, and, in the instant case, the dissent
believed such a denial was proper. See id. at 502-04.
51. See Jason H. Ehrenberg, Note, A Callfor Reform of Recent Immigration Legislation, 32 U.
MICH. J.L. REFoRM 195, 196 (1998) (discussing how in the mid-1990's the rising cost of illegal
immigration provoked Congress to overhaul INS proceedings).
52. See Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Congress, 1, 3 (1995) ("We
also need to look at legislative reforms to streamline the removal process, to tighten the criteria for
relief from deportation, and to remove the potential for procedural abuses.") (statement of Lamar
Smith, Chairman of the Subcomm.).
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Smith, the government's loss of control over the deportation process had
caused a "crisis in deportation." " Smith argued that one reason for this
loss of control was that aliens who had resided in the United States for
only short periods of time "often file meritless claims for asylum, dilatory procedural motions, or frivolous appeals, all in an effort to extend
their stay. ' ' 4
During the election year of 1996, United States immigration policy
was the subject of heated political debate, 55 as well as the focal point of
what some have deemed "anti-immigrant sentiment. In the fall of that
year, Congress approved the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996,"' which drastically changed immigration law
and the process by which aliens could obtain judicial review of deportation actions.58 According to the Conference Report accompanying the
IIRIRA, the purpose of the Act was to "improve deterrence of illegal
immigration to the United
States by... reforming exclusion and deporS
,,59
tation law and procedures.
One of the most significant changes instituted by the IRIRA was a
restriction on judicial review of challenges to the removal process. 60 Section 1252(g) states that:
[E]xcept as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other
provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or
claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action
by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
61
or execute removal orders against any alien under this act.
Members of Congress who believed that the IIRIRA removed judicial
review of many INS decisions and eliminated important safeguards

53. Id. at 1.
54. Id. at 2.
55. See Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration Jurisprudence,
67 U. CIN. L. REv. 185, 205-06 (1998) (reporting that during this period Congress constantlykept
calling on the Commissioner of INS to defend the naturalization process).
56. Christopher W. Rudolph, Globalization, Sovereignty, and Migration: A Conceptual
Framework,3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 325, 326-27 (1998).
57. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Titles 8 & 18 U.S.C.).
58. See Cole, supra note 38, at 2486-87.
59. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-828, at 1 (1996).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1997).
61. Id. § 1252(g). Section 1252(b)(9), another amended provision, entitled "Exclusive
Jurisdiction" provides that:
[Jiudicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding
brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.
Id. § 1252(b)(9) (1997).
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against abuse criticized this provision.62 Nevertheless, Congress passed
the IIRIRA, and President Bill Clinton signed it into effect in September
of 1996.
II. RENO V. AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DIsCRIMINATION COMMITTEE
A. Facts and ProceduralHistory

In 1987, the INS instituted deportation proceedings against eight
aliens because of their affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group known for international terrorist activities.63 The INS charged all eight under the provisions of the INA, portions
of which were subsequently repealed, which allowed for the deportation
of aliens who advocate world communism.' It also charged six of the
aliens with routine status violations.' The aliens responded by filing an
ancillary action in district court challenging the constitutionality of the
INA and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney
General, the INS, and various immigration officials.' The INS dropped
the communist-advocation charges, but it retained the routine status violation charges against six of the aliens. It also charged the other two, who
were permanent residents, under another section of the INA, which allowed for the deportation of aliens who were members of essentially
terrorist organizations."
INS regional counsel William Odencrantz publicly stated that the
INS was seeking deportation of the eight individuals because of their
affiliation with the PFLP.' In response, the eight individuals amended
their complaint to include a claim that the INS was selectively enforcing
immigration laws in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.69
The district court preliminarily enjoined the INS from deporting the eight
aliens based on the aliens' showing that INS had targeted them for deportation solely on the basis of their affiliation with the PFLP and because the INS did not enforce routine status requirements against aliens

62. See 142 CONG. REC. HI 1054 (daily ed. September 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Mink).
63. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct 936, 938; see also
Brief for Petitioner, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct 936 (No. 971252) (1999), available in 1998 WL 411431:
From its founding in 1967, the PFLP has proclaimed the United States to be one of its
principal enemies .... Among its many acts of international terrorism, the PFLP hijacked
five aircraft in one weekend in 1970, killed 16 United States citizens at Israel's Ld
Airport in 1972, assassinated the United States Ambassador to Lebanon in 1976, and
conducted a campaign of attacks against moderate Palestinian officials during the mid1980's, including assassinations.
Id. at *2 n.l.
64. See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 938.
65. See id. at 939.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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who were not members of terrorist groups. ° The district court also found
that the possibility of deportation, combined with the chill to the aliens'
first amendment rights, constituted irreparable harm.7'
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's injunction as to six of the individuals and reversed as to two of
the PFLP members." The Ninth Circuit rejected the Attorney General's
arguments that selective enforcement claims were inappropriate in the
immigration context and that Section 1105a of the Immigration and Nationality Act precluded pre-final order review. 3 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, which entered an injunction in favor of the two PFLP members.
While the Attorney General's appeal of this last decision was pending, Congress passed the IRIRA, which repealed the judicial review
scheme set forth in Section 1105a.74 The Attorney General filed motions
in the district court and the court of appeals arguing that Section 1252(g)
deprived it of jurisdiction over the action.75 The Ninth Circuit consolidated the Attorney General's appeal from the district court's denial of
that motion with the appeal already pending in the circuit and affirmed
the existence of jurisdiction under Section 1252, as well as the injunc76
tions.
The Attorney General appealed, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari." The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
and ruled that IIRIRA Section 1252(g) deprived the federal courts of
jurisdiction over the action.
B. Supreme Court Decision
1. Majority Opinion
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, reviewed the facts and history of
the case in Part I of the opinion.79 In Part II, the Court addressed the issue
of whether the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the AAADC action
pursuant to Section 1252(g).' ° The Court framed the issue in the context

70.
71.
72.
1995).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
granting
78.
79.
80.

Id.
See id.
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 70 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm, 70 F.3d at 1048.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 ed. & Supp. 1 1997).
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 939.
See id.
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 118 S. Ct. 2059 (1998) (order
certiorari).
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 958 (1999).
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 938-39.
See 8 U.S.C. 1252(g) (1994 ed. & Supp. 11I 1997).
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of Sections 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1), two conflicting provisions concerning the effective date of the IIRIRA.8 ' Section 309(c)(1) states that the
revised removal procedures, including the judicial-review procedures of
Section 1252, will not apply to aliens already in exclusion or deportation
proceedings on the Act's effective date. 82 However, Section 306(c)(1)
states that only Section 1252(g) "shall apply without limitation to claims
arising from all past, pending or future exclusion, deportation or removal
proceedings."" The Court noted that both the Government and respondents had interpreted Section 12 52 (g) as applying to nearly all deportation claims. 84
The Court found that this broad interpretation was problematic for
several reasons. If Section 1252(g) covered all deportation claims and
incorporated all the other jurisdiction-related provisions of Section 1252,
then Section 309(c)(1) would be rendered meaningless.8 5 If, on the other

hand, Section 1252(g) did not incorporate the other jurisdiction-related
provisions of Section 1252, thus giving Section 309(c)(1) meaning, Section 1252(g) would stand alone. 86, Applying the parties' broad interpretation of Section 1252(g) to this scenario would mean that judicial review
of all deportation claims would be nonexistent, even after the entry of a
final order. 87 The answers to this dilemma that were offered by the Attor88
ney General and both parties where rejected by the Court as implausible.
According to the Court, the "seeming anomaly" that prompted the
parties', as well as the Ninth Circuit's, "strained reading" of Section
12 52(g) was really a "mirage. '' 89 This "anomaly" stemmed from a mistaken belief that Section 306(c)(1) could not be read to envision a
straightforward application of the jurisdictional provisions of Section
1252 incorporated in Section 1252(g).' Furthermore, such an application
of 306(c)(1) would produce in all pending INS cases jurisdictional restrictions identical to those contained in the IIRIRA.9' Thus, the effective
date provisions of Section 309(c)(1) would be nullified. 2 The Court went
on to state that the belief that Section 306(c)(1) could not be applied in a
straightforward manner rested on another mistaken assumption-that
Section 1252(g) covers all deportation claims.93

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct at 938-41.
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 309(c)(1) (1996).
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 306(c) (1996).
See American-Arab Anti-DiscriminationComm., 119 S. Ct. at 941.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 943.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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To the contrary, the Court ruled that 1252(g) applies to only three
separate actions that the Attorney General may take: the "decision or
action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
orders."' By interpreting Section 1252(g) narrowly to only three distinct
actions, the Court reconciled Section 306(c)(1) with Section 309(c)(1).95
Section 306(c)(1) could thus be applied without swallowing Section
309(c)(1). 6
In support of this narrow interpretation, the Court pointed to other
actions, such as the decision to open an investigation, which it believed
was not encompassed by 1252(g). 97 The Court further justified its interpretation by explaining that 1252(g) serves the purpose of excluding
from non-final-order review those transitional cases pending on the ef98
fective date. Moreover, 1252(g) serves the continual function of excluding from non-final-order review those collateral cases challenging
the Attorney General's choice to initiate one of the discretionary actions
specified in Section 1252(g). 99 According to the Court, 1252(g) was
aimed at reducing judicial restraint of the Attorney General's exercise of
prosecutorial discretion as well as the fragmentation and prolongation of
removal proceedings.' °
Next, the Court addressed the issue of whether the doctrine of constitutional doubt required the Court to interpret Section 1252(g) in such a
way as to permit immediate review of the selective enforcement
claims. 0 ' The AAADC had argued that constitutional doubt applied because the final review under Section 1252(a)(1) was unavailing due to a
lack of factual development, habeas relief was unavailable, and either
review would come too late to prevent the "chilling effect" upon First
Amendment rights. 10
The Court declined to apply the doctrine and noted that as a general
matter, an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to
assert the selective enforcement defense against his removal. °3 The
Court discussed the difficulty in proving such a claim. ' °4 Furthermore,
according to the Court, the interest of the deportation target in avoiding
selective treatment is less compelling than in a criminal context because
deportation is not a punishment but is sought to bring an end to an on94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 944.
Id. at 945.
See id.
See id.
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going violation of U.S. law.'0 5 In reaching its decision, the Court noted
that it would not rule out the possibility of a case in which discrimination
was so outrageous that its reluctance to question executive discretion
would not be overcome.106
2. Justice Ginsburg's concurrence
Although Justice Ginsburg agreed that Section 12 52(g) deprived the
courts of jurisdiction over the AAADC's prefinal-order suit, 10 7 she declined to prejudge the question of whether the AAADC may assert a selective enforcement objection when, and if, it sought review of a final
order of removal pursuant to Section 1252(a)(1).' °8 Part I of her concurrence addressed the question of when the Constitution requires immediate judicial intervention in federal administrative procedures.' °9 As a
framework for addressing this issue, Ginsburg discussed the cases addressing federal injunctions to stop state procedures in order to secure
constitutional rights."0 Ginsburg interpreted these decisions as suggesting that interlocutory intervention in INS proceedings would be feasible,
notwithstanding a statutory bar, if "the INS acts in bad faith, lawlessly,
or in patent violation of constitutional rights.""' This test would be more
stringent then the requirements for a preliminary injunction and would
also require a demonstration of a strong likelihood of success on the
merits.' 2 Ginsburg believed that the merits 3of the AAADC's case were
too uncertain to establish such a likelihood."
This concurrence also addressed the AAADC's argument that the inability to raise selective enforcement claims during the administrative
process made immediate judicial review necessary."1 4 Ginsburg recognized Congress' strong interest in avoiding delay of deportation proceedings and found the opportunity to raise a claim during the judicial
review phase sufficient."1 5 Moreover, she emphasized the Attorney General's position that the reviewing court of appeals may transfer a case to
a district court for resolution of pertinent issues of material fact.16

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See id. at 947.
Id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).
See id.
See id. at 947-48
See id. at 948.

111.

Id.

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See id.
See id. at 949.
See id.
See id.
See id.

DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

In Part II of her concurrence, Ginsburg disagreed with the Court's
17
approach to selective enforcement claims in the immigration context.
She believed that the viability of such objections should be left an open
question." 8 Under the Court's selective prosecution doctrine, the decision
to prosecute cannot be based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race
or other arbitrary classification, including the exercise of constitutional
rights." 9 According to Ginsburg, selective enforcement of immigration
laws should not be exempt from that prescription. " If the Government
sought deportation of an individual based on unconstitutional reasons,
the redress for that violation should not be lessened because deportation
was less significant or harmful than incarceration."' Ginsburg summarized her opinion by stating that if the AAADC were to demonstrate a
strong likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and a chilling effect
on current speech, and if the Court were to find the agency's actions flagrantly improper, immediate judicial intervention would be in order."'
3. Justice Stevens' Concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurrence focused on the conflict between the effective date provisions of 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1).'2 3 His resolution to
this anomaly differed from the majority's because he believed that the
Act contained a scrivener's error. 114 According to Stevens, the plain
meaning of Sections 1252(b)(9) and (g) was clear: the former postpones
judicial review of removal proceedings until the entry of a final order of
removal while the later deprives courts of jurisdiction over collateral
challenges to ongoing proceedings. If the word "Act" was substituted
for the word "Section" in the opening phrase of Section 1252(g), the
substitution would remove any obstacle to giving effect to the plain
meaning of Sections 306(c)(1) and 309(c)(1). 2 Judicial review of collateral attacks would be effective immediately while aliens already in deportation hearings would not be affected by the Act's revised removal
procedures. 27 Stevens recognized the ambiguity in the text of Section
309 because it refers to the "case" of an alien in deportation proceedings,
which could include AAADC's collateral attack. He resolved this ambiguity by reasoning that because such a reading would be inconsistent
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with Section 306, Congress intended Section 309 to aPply only to the
INS deportation proceedings that it expressly mentioned.
Despite the scrivener's error, Stevens believed that Congress' intent
for disposition of proceedings such as AAADC's was clear and the case
should be dismissed. Stevens agreed with Section III of the Court's
opinion and also agreed with Souter's explanation of why Section
1252(g) applies broadly to removal proceedings."' However, he did not
share in Souter's decision to apply the constitutional doubt doctrine.1
4. Justice Souter's Dissent.
According to Justice Souter, because the Act contains two mutually
exclusive effective date provisions that cannot be reconciled, the doctrine
of constitutional doubt should be invoked to avoid potential constitutional difficulty.I33 According to his interpretation of the statute, Section
306(c)(1) retroactively applies Section 1252(g).1 4 The problem is that
Section 309(c)(1)(A) makes Section 1252 inapplicable to an alien who is
already in deportation proceedings.135 Thus, it would appear that aliens
who did not obtain judicial review prior to the Act's enactment date and
who were in proceedings as of the Act's effective date could never obtain
judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal orders. 1 6 The two effective date provisions appear to remove any form of judicial review of such
decisions by the Attorney37General for aliens in deportation proceedings
between those two dates.
Justice Souter believed that the issue of judicial review was further
complicated by Section 309(c)(1)(B) which provides that in the case of
aliens who are already in proceedings before the effective date, the proceedings, including judicial review thereof, will continue without regard
to Section 1252.' Consequently, he interpreted Section 309(c)(1)(B) as
preserving preexisting judicial review for the same class of aliens to
whom Section 306(c)(1) bars review. 39 Justice Souter concluded that the
found in Sections 306(c)(1) and
conflicting effective date provisions
°
1
reconciled.
be
not
could
309(c)(1)
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Justice Souter disagreed with the Court's attempt to solve the "interpretive anomaly.' 41 In his opinion, the Court interpreted Section 1252(g)
too narrowly. 142 According to Souter, it would be illogical for Congress
to want to preserve interim review of those actions, such as the decision
to open an investigation, but not of the other actions described in Section
1252(g).' 43 Furthermore, Souter noted that there was no plausible explanation of why the exclusivity provisions of Section 1252(g) should not
apply after the effective date to review of those decisions by the Attorney
General that the Court gave as examples.' 44
In support of its decision, the Court suggested that Congress could
not have intended the words "'commence proceedings, adjudicate cases,
and execute removal orders' to stand for the entire deportation process
because such language, the Court believed, was not precise legislative
drafting. Yet, Justice Souter felt that one could just as plausibly conclude that Congress employed subject headings to bar review of all the46
stages in the deportation process to which challenges might be brought.'
Moreover, the Court's examples, such as the decision to open an investigation, could easily fall under one of47the three stages in the deportation
process that Congress had addressed.
Because the contradiction between Sections 303(c)(1) and 309(c)(1)
was irreconcilable, Justice Souter argued that 309(c)(1) should prevail
for several reasons. First, it seemed highly improbable that Congress
meant to raise a permanent barrier to those aliens in the deportation proceedings on the Act's effective date. 49 Second, such a preclusion of judicial review would raise the serious constitutional question as to whether
Congress may block every remedy for enforcing a constitutional right. 0
Because Justice Souter thought that Section 309(c)(1) should prevail
over Section 306(c)(1), the law afforded the AAADC an opportunity to
litigate its claims in district court. 5'
Justice Souter stated that this approach avoided the problem of addressing the unbriefed issue of whether selective enforcement claims
could be brought in the immigration context. He addressed the Court's
statement that the alien's interest in selective enforcement was less com-
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pelling than in the criminal context.'53 Like Justice Ginsburg, Souter did
not think that there was a real difference in interest between selective
enforcement in either context. 5 4 Therefore, prosecutorial discretion
should not be exercised to violate protected liberties in either context.'
HI. ANALYSIS

A.

The Court's interpretationof Section 1252(g) is consistent with its
interpretationsof otherjurisdictionstripping statutes

The Court's interpretation of Section 1252(g) is consistent with its
interpretation of other statutes that have appeared to foreclose jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that absent clear statutory language
precluding judicial review, such statutes will be interpreted in favor of
finding federal question jurisdiction.'" In AAADC, the Court found express intent to limit judicial review. However, the Court limited this jurisdictional prohibition to only three types of executive action and insured that judicial review was not entirely foreclosed.' 7 The Court's willingness to interpret laws in favor of judicial review has been consistently
demonstrated by its decisions addressing jurisdiction-stripping laws.'
For example, in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,
a group of family physicians challenged the constitutionality of a Medicare Act regulation that authorized different payments for similar physician service. 5 9 The Secretary of Health and Human Services argued that
Congress had prohibited judicial review of all questions arising from
payment of benefits under the Medicare program. The Court began its
opinion by emphasizing the presumption that Congress intends judicial
review of administrative actions to remain available. According to the
Court, the presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action "may be overcome by inferences of intent drawn from the statutory

153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See Johnson v Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373 (1974) (stating that where Congress intends to
preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear); see also McNary
v. Haitian Refugee Center, 498 U.S. 479, 483 (1991) ("We hold that given the absence of clear
congressional language mandating preclusion of federal jurisdiction... the District Court had
jurisdiction to hear respondents' constitutional and statutory challenges to INS procedures.").
157. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S.Ct. at 941.:
If, on the other hand, the phrase 'except as provided in this section' were (somehow)
interpreted not to incorporate the other jurisdictional provisions of §1252-if §1252
stood alone, so to speak-judicial review would be foreclosed for all deportation claims
in all pending deportation cases, even after entry of a final order.
Id.
158. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Restrictions
on Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29 U. MEM L. REV. 295 (1999) ("[I]t
seems
accurate to say that unless federal statutes completely preclude all federal jurisdiction, congressional
restrictions on jurisdiction likely will be upheld.").
159. Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 669 (1986).
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scheme as a whole."' 6 The Court stated that a "serious constitutional
question" would arise if it interpreted
the statute to foreclose all judicial
61
review of constitutional claims.

Similarly, in Webster v. Doe, the Court narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional provision of a statute in favor of allowing for judicial review
of constitutional claims. 62 In Webster, a discharged employee brought
suit against the Central Intelligence Agency, claiming that he was fired
because of his sexual orientation.'63 The government argued that the discretionary termination decisions of the CIA Director, made pursuant to
Section 102(c) of the National Security Act ("NSA"), were barred from
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The
Court held that the statutory language and structure of NSA Section
102(c) sufficiently precluded judicial review under the APA of the Director's discretionary termination decisions." The Court narrowly interpreted the jurisdictional prohibition contained in Section 102(c) as inapplicable to constitutional claims arising from the Director's actions.'"
The Court emphasized the need for a heightened showing of Congressional intent to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims in order
to avoid serious constitutional concerns.'" Because the Government did
not make such a showing, the Court found that the District Court had
jurisdiction over the discharged employee's constitutional claims."'
B

Available Forums after Reno v. AAADC

The Court's holding in AAADC effectively foreclosed the loophole
created by Chen Fan Kwok v. INS for parallel challenges to deportation.
After AAADC, an alien's access to district court is significantly restricted
if the action is deemed to fit into one of the three categories of discretionary action enumerated in Section 1252(g). In the context of federal
laws regulating immigration, the substantive due process accorded aliens
is only that of rationality review. 68 Yet, aliens are still protected by the
procedural due process requirements set forth in Matthews v. Eldridge.'69
In light of AAADC, aliens have several options for obtaining judicial
review of constitutional claims that satisfy procedural due process.
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Michigan Academy of Family Physicians,476 U.S. at 673.
Id. at 681 n.12.
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Id. at 601.
Id. at 603.
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See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, § 9.5.4 at 621.
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1. Appeals from Final Orders of Deportation
As an initial option for obtaining judicial review, an alien may appeal from a final order of deportation. 7 ' In INS v. Chadha,"' the Court
ruled that an appeal of a final order encompasses all matters on which the
final order is contingent, including constitutional claims. Once the appeal has been filed, the reviewing court of appeals may remand the case
for further fact finding.'73 Although an alien may receive judicial review
of constitutional claims at the appellate level, it is unclear whether claims
of selective prosecution can receive review at all.
In AAADC, the Court noted that their ruling generally denies aliens
the defense of selective prosecution. 7 4 According to the Court, when the
INS has not held a hearing, Section 2347(b)(1) authorizes remand to a
district court. 75 The Court declined to address the issue of whether the
language of the statute could be interpreted to require a hearing on a particular issue, such as selective enforcement. 76 Justice Ginsburg believed
that such review was available, and stated that if a court of appeals could
not review selective enforcement claims, the statute may be unconstitutional. 77 Moreover, she noted the Attorney General's position that the
reviewing court of appeals may transfer a case to district court for further
fact-finding. Justice Ginsburg as well as the Court found the opportu79
nity to raise a collateral challenge at the appellate level sufficient.
2. Flagrant violations of constitutional rights
In extreme circumstances, aliens may have the option to obtain immediate judicial review. Although the Court declined to directly address
the issue, it appeared to suggest immediate judicial intervention, prior to
the exhaustion of administrative remedies, in a situation involving "outrageous" violations of constitutional rights.' 0 In her concurring opinion,
Justice Ginsburg stated that if the respondents were able to demonstrate a
strong likelihood of success on the merits, a chilling effect on current

170. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) (1994 & Supp. In 1997); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (1997):
Judicial review of a final order of removal (other than an order of removal without a
hearing pursuant to section 1225(b)(1) of this title) is governed only by chapter 158 of
title 28, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section and except that the court may
not order the taking of additional evidence under section 2347(c) of such title.
Id.
171.
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177.
178.
179.
180.

Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938 (1983).
See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 938.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c) (1994).
See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. 936, 947 n.10 (1999).
See American-ArabAnti-Discrimination Comm., 119 S. Ct. at 947 n.10
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See id. at 948.
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speech, and "flagrantly improper" administrative action, "precedent and
sense would counsel immediate judicial intervention."'"' Although the
Court criticized Ginsburg's analysis of cases involving immediate judicial intervention'82 the majority, combined with Ginsburg's concurrence,
seems to suggest immediate, prefinal-order judicial intervention in extreme situations.
3.

Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction

Depending on the jurisdiction, habeas corpus jurisdiction may
be a third option for obtaining judicial review. In AAADC, the Court
noted that the circuits were split as to the availability of habeas corpus in
the wake of IIRIRA.'83 The Court did not directly address this conflict
and the circuit courts remain split. It now appears that the availability of
habeas corpus jurisdiction is contingent upon the jurisdiction, as well as
whether the court views a constitutional claim as fitting into one of the
three categories under Section 1252(g) that the Supreme Court declared
to be insular and discrete.' u
For example, in Jurado-Guitierrez,the Tenth Circuit held that the
IIRIRA did not preclude traditional habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §2241 .18 Jurado-Guitierrezinvolved the consolidated appealINof four
•• immigration
186
N cases challenging the constitutionality of an
INA provision. The INA provision at issue allows aliens in exclusion
proceedings to apply to the Attorney General for a discretionary waiver
of their deportation order, but does not permit the same opportunity for
aliens in removal proceedings. 87 The Government had argued that Section 1252(g), among other sections of the INA amended by the IIRIRA
and AEDPA, precluded habeas corpus jurisdiction over the aliens' peti188
tions. The Tenth Circuit rejected the Governments argument, and citing
AAADC, held that Section 1252(g) only barred challenges to three dis-

181. Id.at950.
182. See id. at 945 n.10. The majrity critized Ginsburg's analysis of cases involving immediate
judicial intervention, but seemed to suggest that pre-final order judicial intervention is appropriate in
extreme situations.
183. See id. at 939.
184. Compare Hypolite v. Blackman, No. 99-0549, 1999 WL 499146, at *3 (M.D.Pa. July 13,
1999) (holding that Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. and the IIRIRA did not
preclude habeas corpus jurisdiction over collateral constitutional claims because no express denial of
habeas jurisdiction existed) with Zawadzka v. INS, No. 96 C 8398, 1999 WL 417357 (N.D. 111.June
16, 1999) (holding that the IRIRA and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm
effectively removed habeas corpus jurisdiction over claims specified in § 1252(g) but that direct
appellate review was still an available option).
185. Jurado-Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 1999).
186. Id.
187. Id.See 8 U.S.C.A §1182(c) (1997). This provision of the INA was amended by the
AEDPA to prohibit aliens, deportable because of their conviction for certain offenses, from applying
to Attorney General for a discretionary waiver of their deportation order).
188. Id. at 1144.
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tinct actions by the Attorney General. 9 Because the aliens were not
challenging one of these three actions, but were instead requesting review of final deportation orders, Section 1252(g) did not bar habeas corpus jurisdiction. According to the court, aside from challenges to the actions enumerated in Section 1252(g), traditional habeas corpus jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains a viable source for judicial review.'
Similarly, in Mustata v. Department of Justice, the Sixth Circuit
found that Section 12 52(g) did not bar the petitioner's writ of habeas
corpus.'9 ' There, petitioners filed a writ of habeas corpus the day before
their deportation order took effect and claimed Fifth Amendment violations due to ineffective assistance of counsel.' 9' The district court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter pursuant to Section
1252(g).' 9' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit noted the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of Section 1252(g) as well as the Court's statement of
other administrative actions not covered by Section 1252(g).' 94 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel did not fall within one of the three discrete actions listed in Section
1252(g) and therefore habeas corpus jurisdiction was proper.195
Yet, in Singh v. Reno, the Seventh Circuit found habeas corpus jurisdiction to be generally unavailable after the enactment of the
IIRIRA. 96 Singh involved issues similar to those in Jurado-Guitierrez.
In Singh, the petitioner had been convicted of second degree reckless
homicide. 97 Following his conviction, the INS had issued an order to
show cause as to why the petitioner should not be deported.' 98 Two years
later, in 1994, an immigration judge closed the proceedings because the
INS paperwork was incomplete.'" In order to finalize the matter, the pe189. Id. (Quoting the Court's language in Reno v. AAADC that section 1252(g) did not apply to
all claims arising from the deportation process).
190. Id. at 1144, 1145. ("We find that the lack of any mention of §2241 habeas review in the
plain language of the statute, combined with the long historical precedent surrounding habeas corpus
review in immigration cases establishes that traditional habeas review under §2241 survived the
enactment of... [the] IMRIRA.")
191. Mustata v. Department of Justice, 179 F.3d 1017, 1019 (6th Cir. 1999).
192. See Mustata, 179 F.3dat 1018.
193. See id. at 1019.
194. See id. at 1020.
195. See id. at 1022.
196. Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 1999). See also LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035
(7th Cir. 1999), holding habeas corpus jurisdiction unavailable to alien challenging the denial of his
application for a waiver of deportation:
If, as we believe in agreement with the government, the deportee can seek review of
constitutional issues in the court of appeals directly, as under the prior regime governing
judicial review of deportation, then the layering of judicial review is avoided, judicial
review is curtailed as Congress intended, but enough of a safety valve is left to enable
judicial correction of bizarre miscarriages ofjustice.
Id. at 1040.
197. See Singh, 182 F.3d at 507.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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titioner had requested that the hearing be rescheduled. 20 ° Because of INS
"foot dragging", the matter was not heard rescheduled until 1996, and
rescheduled again several more times.2" During this time, Congress
passed the AEDPA and IRIRA, which authorized deportation for the
criminal convictions, such as the petitioners, and barred such individuals
from applying for a discretionary waiver of deportation.20' Following
entry of a final order of deportation, the petitioner filed a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus jurisdiction in district court. The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court and held that habeas corpus jurisdiction was
not proper pursuant to Section 1252(g)." The Seventh Circuit noted the
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1252(g) in Reno v. AAADC
as limited to those listed discretionary actions. Yet, according to the Seventh Circuit, Section 1252(g) prohibited habeas review of challenges to
removal orders, such as the petitioners.
4. Class Action Challenges to INS Practices
In light of the streamlined review process, class actions, such as the
suit in McNary v. HaitianRefugee Center, may be an important means of
204
challenging INS practices. In McNary, the Court acknowledged that to
establish unfair INS practices, the respondents had adduced a substantial
amount of evidence that would have been irrelevant to an individual determination on appeal.2 5 Furthermore, the Court noted that the court of
appeals reviewing an individual case would not likely have an adequate
record as to a pattern of INS abuses. 2 6 The Court acknowledged that in
"pattern in practice" cases, district court fact-finding is essential.20 In the
wake of AAADC, the feasibility of such actions may depend upon
whether the particular jurisdiction views the underlying claim as a challenge to executive discretionary action.0 8
For example, in Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, the Fifth Circuit found that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a class action claim of fifty illegal aliens because the action essentially challenged executive discretionary action. °9 On the other hand, in Tefel v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit distinguished between the implementation of a program affecting an entire

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. id. at 509.
204. McNarry v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991).
205. See HaitianRefugee Ctr., 498 U.S. at 497.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Compare Alvidres-Reyes v. Reno, 180 F. 3d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that federal
courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over aliens' class action because the action challenged
essentially discretionary decisions) with Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1297 (1lth Cir. 1999)
(determining that district court jurisdiction was proper for class wide challenges to INS practices).
209. Alvidres-Reyes, 180 F. 3d at 206.
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class of individuals and individual challenges to INS actions."' The court
of appeals found jurisdiction to be proper because the aliens were challenging a program, pattern or scheme by immigration officials that allegedly violated the constitutional rights of aliens."' In Tefel, neither
AAADC nor Section 1252(g) altered jurisdiction over the class-wide allegations of constitutional violations committed by the INS. 2
IV. CONCLUSION

The Court's holding in AAADC is consistent with its history of interpreting jurisdictional restrictions in a manner that does not foreclose
all judicial review. In the wake of AAADC, judicial review of claims
arising from the deportation process has been significantly streamlined.
However, aliens continue to have narrow opportunities for judicial review. Individuals may still raise constitutional claims at the appellate
level in the context of a final order of deportation. Also, AAADC appears
to suggest that immediate judicial intervention remains available in
situations involving gross violations of constitutional rights. Because the
circuits are split on the availability of habeas corpus review under the
IIRIRA, aliens may have this option in certain jurisdictions.
Although judicial review has not been completely foreclosed, the
key to obtaining review may lie in how a claim is framed. The Court has
emphasized that claims based on the three discretionary actions listed in
Section 12 52(g) are reviewable only as an appeal from a final order of
deportation. Yet, because the concept of what is included as one of the
three discretionary actions is subjective, courts will vary as to whether an
alien's claim fits into one of these categories. Consequently, aliens
should characterize their claims so as to not challenge one of the three
discretionary actions in order to have the best opportunity to obtain judicial review in the wake of AAADC.
Meghan Dougherty
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